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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses recent changes to the policy landscape on global food security. 
It argues that a new consensus is emerging on how to tackle (or more hubristically 
‘end’) global hunger and spur agricultural development. The consensus I speak of is 
evident in recent briefings by the World Economic Forum (especially its ‘New Vision 
for Agriculture’), the ‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition,’ initiated by the 
G-8 (now G-7), the Grow Africa network, the US government’s ‘Feed the Future’ 
programme, the philanthropy-led, Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa, not to 
mention the many flagship reports emanating from the International Financial 
Institutions as well key statements from global food retailers and leading 
agribusinesses. The paper argues that this ‘new vision’ for global agriculture is 
deeply problematic. Indeed the projected ‘solutions’ – in so far as they aim to 
radically transform agricultural life, especially in Africa – may well cause more harm 
than good. To put this argument more forcefully: what today is commonly called 
‘food security’ is perhaps better seen as a way of subjugating the poor under the 
pretence of doing them good.  
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Behind the last row of seats, a line of television cameras balanced on 
tripods, and as the huddled masses of scheming journalisti pushed into the 
little theatre, so did the buzz of prime-time hunger – transnational media, 
topic-A, try-to-spin-it-your-editor’s-way hunger. This was just the kind of 
hunger extravaganza the FAO publicity pack had labored for months to 
achieve: stuffed-pressroom, carabinieri-guarded, media-credentialed, and 
security-checked hunger, attended to by hordes of harried interns and 
crimson-blazered, perma-smiling FAO staff.  This was the Nobel Peace 
Prize hunger, private-reception hunger, bedizened and be-flagged, flanked 
and branded by baby-blue FAO logo. Here was hunger tailored-made for 
the TV standups in their heels and makeup, ready for starvation Q&A. 
Here was hunger all gussied up in its ancient royal regalia, ready to 
seduce column inches from the New York Times and Reuters and 
Newsweek and the BBC. This was scramble-for-your-seat, silver-pitcher-
of-iced-water-on-the-desk, video-streaming, closed-circuit hunger. High-
Level Hunger. No hungry people in sight. Everyone could smell a story. 
 
– Frederick Kaufman, Bet the Farm: How Food Stopped Being Food 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When the G8 met for its 34th summit in Hokkaidō, Japan, in the summer of 
2008, global hunger was high on the agenda. The recent global food price crisis of 
2007-2008 had shattered any optimism of achieving the second Millennium 
Development Goal dedicated to halving the proportion of people globally that suffer 
hunger (never mind the more ambitious World Food Summit goal of halving the total 
number of hungry people in the world by 2015). The G8 promised immediate and 
firm action. Hunger would be tackled, high prices would be dampened and political 
stability restored. But then the news broke.  
 
Somehow the dinner menu from the luxurious Windsor hotel, where the world 
leaders dined, was leaked to the press. ‘To be sure, no-one expects senior politicians 
discussing poverty and hunger to survive off airdropped rice,’ commented Tim 
Hayward at the Guardian, but a menu consisting of nineteen extravagant dishes – 
including such mouth-watering delights as sea-urchin, caviar, kelp-flavoured cold 
kyoto beef (served with asparagus and dressed with sesame cream), a ‘G8 fantasy 
dessert,’ all washed down from a choice of five different wines and liqueurs – 
highlighted the hypocrisy of the ‘hungercrats’ who publicly warned the poor of the 
coming austerity, instructing them to ‘tighten their belts,’ meanwhile, satiated and 
satisfied, they loosen theirs.1  
 
The press leak chastened and embarrassed global leaders. Instead of directing 
the public gaze to the plight of the ‘haves less,’ attention turned instead to the ethics 
and behaviour of the global elite. In the flurry of reporting and commentary that 
followed, journalists questioned not only the integrity of the political classes – 																																																								
1 Tim Hayward, “On the Menu at the G8: The Guardian (July 2008), available: 
http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/wordofmouth/2008/jul/07/g8japanfoodmenu (accessed 
September 2015); Frederick Kaufman, Bet the Farm: How Food Stopped Being Food (Hoboken, N.J.: 
Wiley, 2012) p. 132. 
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understandably their conduct was widely castigated as distasteful and insensitive – but 
also the very role and symbolic function of hunger summits themselves at which 
global leaders seem to take turns to outdo one another in the politics of pity.  The 
daily expressions of solidarity and promises of humanitarian assistance that pour forth 
from such meetings seemed to some to be a cynical exercise in diversion – panem et 
circenses, only with caviar instead of bread.  
 
In academic circles a great deal of work has been undertaken on how we 
represent stricken others. In the work of Boltanski on ‘distant suffering’ 2 , in 
Benthall’s writing on the emergence on ‘disaster-media-relief complex’3, in Susan 
Moeller’s work on the Western geographical imagination of suffering4, and indeed in 
a whole slew of recent writing on the politics of philanthropy5 and humanitarianism6, 
the spectacle of ‘the body in pain’ is often described as a necessary precondition for 
Westerners to imagine themselves as the valiant redeemer of an abject disaster 
victim.7 Indeed, Alex de Waal has even suggested that aid agencies and international 
relief organisations knowingly peddle traumatic images, deliberately amplify the 
sense of crisis, in order to promote and fund their efforts to ease the misfortune of 
others.8  For this reason Jonathan Benthall argues that we conceptualise giving as a 
form of exchange; broadly speaking images of suffering flow northwards, while 
packages of aid flow southwards.9  As well as enabling the Western aid reflex these 
tragedy-as-spectacle events also allow non-sufferers to cling to the cosy conceit that 
they are not responsible for the pain on display.10  The more tragedy we see, the more 
we redouble our efforts to wage war against misfortune – to ‘end’ hunger, ‘eradicate’ 
disease, and to ‘make poverty history.’ Ours is a mission of reform, not recompense, 
because we cannot readily see how we have anything to do with the suffering 
presented to us, except of course to bravely help with its remediation. 
 
																																																								
2 Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
3 Jonathon Benthall, Disasters, Relief and the Media (Wantage: Sean Kingston Publishing, 2010). 
4 Susan D. Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death 
(London, Routledge, 1999). 
5 For example, see Behrooz Morvaridi, “Capitalist Philanthropy and the New Green Revolution for 
Food Security”, International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture & Food, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2012), pp 
243–256; David Nally and Stephen Taylor, “The politics of self-help: The Rockefeller Foundation, 
philanthropy and the “long” Green Revolution”, Political Geography (2015), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2015.04.005; Japhy Wilson, “Fantasy Machine: Philanthrocapitalism 
as an Ideological Formation”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 7 (2012), pp 1144-1161. 
6 See, for example, Samuel Moyn, 2014. Human Rights and the Uses of History. London: Verso, 
2014); Simon Reid-Henry, “Humanitarianism as Liberal Diagnostic: The Geography of Humanitarian 
Reason and the Political Rationalities of the Liberal Will-to-Care”, Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2012): pp 418-431; Rob Skinner and Alan Lester, 
“Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2012): pp 729–747 
7 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988). 
8 Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa (Oxford: African 
Rights & The International African Institute in Association with James Curry and Indiana University 
Press, 2002). 
9 Benthall, op. cit.  p xiv. 
10 James Wan, “The Politics of Pity”, New African (January, 2015), pp 10-12. 
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The present essay is an effort to extend the kinds of critical discussions that 
flowed in the wake of the G-8 scandal as well as add to the various academic critiques 
sketched above. In what follows I try to scratch behind the benevolent-sounding 
sentiments and pledges of the ‘hungercrats’ to expose the power dynamics and the 
global structures that lie hidden at their base. Exposing those power dynamics and 
global structures is important not least because the ministration of programmes of aid, 
far from being the solution to poverty, is frequently part of poverty’s perpetuation. 
Indeed, the claim to ‘help’ and ‘assist,’ as philosopher Marianne Gronemeyer has 
argued, is often ‘a means of keeping the bit in the mouths of subordinates without 
letting them feel the power that is guiding them.’11  Here narratives of help and 
redemption are a constitutive moment in the creation and reproduction of the 
conditions of oppression – what poet Seamus Heaney memorably termed ‘pap for the 
dispossessed.’12  
 
In what follows I apply these insights to the discourses and practices of global 
food security, and especially the recrudescence of food security initiatives in the wake 
of the global food crisis. My concern is that a consensus is emerging on how best to 
tackle global hunger and deliver agricultural development. The consensus I am 
talking about is evident in briefings by the World Economic Forum (especially its 
‘New Vision for Agriculture’), the G-8’s ‘New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition,’ the Grow Africa network, the US government’s ‘Feed the Future’ 
programme, the philanthropy-led, ‘Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa,’ not to 
mention the many flagship reports emanating from the International Financial 
Institutions as well strategic statements from global food retailers and leading 
agribusinesses.  
 
The formation of a consensus is troubling in my view. The US army General 
George Patton used to say that ‘if everyone is thinking alike then somebody isn’t 
thinking.’ How well this truism applies to the food security solutions today where the 
trend – with a few important exceptions – is to promote high-tech, capitalist 
agriculture and market-led initiatives to resolve global food insecurity. If pursued, I 
argue, this ‘solution’ will lead to lasting and drastic changes to land use, most notably 
the supplanting of small-scale peasant and subsistence-based agriculture with large-
scale industrial production of just a few commercial crops. This is what has been 
happening under the auspices of global farmland acquisitions or what critics term 
‘land grabbing’ – whereby local growers are expelled from the land and cash cropping 
and biofuel production takes their place – but unfortunately the problem, as this essay 
seeks to show, is much more pervasive than this very specific case might imply.13 
 
In my reading, then, the consensus – as I am calling it – rests on a series of 
mythologies about global food insecurity. By ‘mythologies’ I mean a sequence of 
socially constructed ideas and narratives that over time are ‘naturalized’ as the truth or 
primary reality. All myths, as Roland Barthes reminds us, are created for a reason; 
modern myths no less so. In most cases, Barthes continues, ‘myths’ help perpetuate 																																																								
11 Marianne Gronemeyer, “Helping”, in W. Sachs (ed.) The Development Dictionary: A Guide to 
Knowledge as Power, (London: Zed Books, 2010), p, 55. 
12 Seamus Heaney, Opened Ground: Poems 1966-1996 (London: Faber and Faber, 1998), p. 130. 
13 David Nally, “Governing Precarious Lives: Land Grabs, Geopolitics and the Rhetoric of ‘Food 
Security’” The Geographical Journal (2014) doi: 10.1111/geoj/12063; Saskia Sassen, Expulsions: 
Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy (Cambridge MA:  Harvard University Press, 2014). 
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an idea of society that suits the interests of the dominant or ruling classes. In other 
words, mythologies lend legitimacy to domination. 14  Accordingly this paper will 
address four dominant food security myths, but before proceeding a few disclaimers 
are in order. First, the selection of four myths is in one sense arbitrary.15 There are 
almost certainly more, although what I try to do here is to focus on themes that I feel 
are most germane to the food policy landscape, especially as it has emerged in the 
wake of the global food price crisis. Second, although the focus is on recent policy, I 
do attempt to anchor emergent strategies in the longue durée of agrarian development. 
This is essential if only to isolate the supposed ‘novelty’ of new programmes and 
policy directions. That said, I am painfully aware that the paper does not do enough to 
isolate alternatives to the consensus I describe.16 This is not because such alternatives 
are too minor or embryonic to be discussed, but rather the opposite: proper treatment 
of the ideas and strategies of the ‘anti-consensus’ would require a separate paper (or 
at least a much longer one than the present iteration). Finally, and crucially, braided 
through this essay is an account of what, after Simon Reid-Henry, we might call the 
‘will-to-care’ – that is, the belief that one’s actions are always undertaken for the 
greater good and thus they ought to be enthusiastically welcomed everywhere.17  C.S. 
Lewis’s observation that the dedicated ‘do-gooder’ may be the most dangerous tyrant 
– because their actions are always carried out ‘with the approval of their own 
conscience’ – is therefore very germane to this discussion: for while it is certainly 
possible to extract examples of elites deliberately using mythologies to fool the 
public, there are many more examples of individuals and organisations acting with the 
‘best intentions’.18 To better appreciate the ideological work of myths we need to 
grasp the powers of desire – the desire to heal, cure and elevate debased others – and 
how this underwrites and makes possible redemptive acts against misfortune. With a 
nod to C.S Lewis, perhaps it is time to consider the desire to ‘save the world’ less as a 
noble attribute and more as a troubling pathology.19 With this in mind we begin our 
analysis with the mythology of utopian technologies, a fine example of ‘benign 
designs’ with disturbing consequences. 
 																																																								
14 Roland Barthes, Mythologies [Trans. by Annette Lavers] (London: Paladin, 1972). 
15 In their best-selling book on global hunger authors Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins identify 
12 myths perpetuating hunger; however, in the recent re-issue of that text the original 12 myths have 
been reduced to 10. Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins, World Hunger: Twelve Myths (New 
York: Grove Press, 1977); Frances Moore Lappé and Joseph Collins, World Hunger: 10 Myths (New 
York: Grove Press, 2015). Susan George’s classic study, How The Other Half Dies: The Real Reasons 
for World Hunger (London: Penguin 1976) was perhaps the first myth-busting book on food security 
(although the term ‘food security’ only came into currency in the late 1970s). While the present essay 
owes a great deal to these inspiring and pioneering accounts, it differs from them in focusing attention 
more squarely on the utopian pretensions underwriting efforts to eradicate hunger and encourage 
Western-style development.  
16 For a brilliant account of the alternatives to the ‘New Alliance’ programme, for example, see Raj 
Patel, Rachel Bezner Kerr, Lizzie Shumba and Laifolo Dakishoni, “Cook, Eat, Man, Woman: 
Understanding the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, Nutritionism and its Alternatives 
from Malawi”, The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 42, No 1 (2015): pp. 21-44. 
17 Reid-Henry, “Humanitarianism as Liberal Diagnostic”, pp 418-431. 
18 C. S. Lewis, “The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment”, Res Judicatae, Vol. 6  (June 1953) p. 228 
19 See especially Eyal Weizman, The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt 
to Gaza (London: Verso 2011); Tania Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the 
Practice of Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). Tony Vaux’s, The Selfish Altruist: Relief 
Work in Famine and War (London: Routledge 2001) offers personal account of desire to improve 
others 
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MYTH #1: TECHNOLOGY IS THE SOLUTION TO GLOBAL 
HUNGER 
 
Technology has always been the handmaiden of agrarian development. Once we 
stopped ‘chasing our food and started to raise it,’ human populations turned to 
engineering and technology to provide a suitable infrastructure and resource base for 
increasingly complex modes of living.20  Larger settlements and proto-urban living 
inspired a transition from extensive to intensive modes of cultivation. Writing systems 
paved the way for trading structures and a greater degree of agricultural 
specialization.  Much later came the steel plough and the shift from draught-powered 
to steam- and oil-powered machinery. There followed the chemicalisation of 
agriculture, nano- and bio-technology, and now synthetic biology. Our technical 
achievements have meant that modern agriculture has been able to feed a growing 
population with a wide variety of products even as agricultural labour is performed by 
fewer and fewer hands.21 
 
This is the story of homo faber, the ‘creative man’ first theorized by Hannah 
Arendt.22  ‘Our confidence in [our] human ability to create a vision and shape it for 
our future,’ writes the serendipitously named Emmanual Faber, co-Chief Operating 
Officer at the food company Danone, ‘has led us to believe that the more we put our 
scientific, rational skills at work to do it and organize ourselves and change our 
environment, the more likely we are to succeed.’ ‘I will call this our “engineering 
bias”’, continues Faber, ‘we think we can engineer the world in which we live, and as 
consequence, the life we live.’23 
 
Today we are gripped by this ‘engineering bias’, a bias that is at least as 
dangerous as it is hubristic.  Techno-optimists believe that there is a cure-all, 
engineering solution to virtually every social problem we face. Geo-engineering will 
reverse climate change. DNA engineering will cure diseases and even produce more 
‘desirable’ human traits.24 New workflow software and technologies will interconnect 
the world, allowing formerly marginalized labour to participate in the global economy 
(as described in the ‘flat world ontologies’ of New York Times columnist Thomas 
Friedman).25  We are told that in the future ‘smart’ technologies will replace ‘dumb’ 
people – ‘it is much easier to teach iPhone to take great pictures than it is to teach 																																																								
20 Monsanto, “Why Does Agriculture Need to be Improved?”, n.p., available: 
http://www.monsanto.com/improvingagriculture/Pages/why-does-agriculture-need-to-be-
improved.aspx (accessed September  2015) 
21 F Giovanni Federico, Feeding the World: An Economic History of Agriculture, 1800-2000 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
22 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
23 Emmanuel Faber, “Some Unconventional Thoughts About Food Security”, (July 2011) available: 
http://downtoearth.danone.com/2011/07/19/some-unconventional-thoughts-about-food-security/ 
(accessed September 2015). 
24 For a positive take on bio- and genetic engineering see S.M. Liao, A. Sandberg and R. Roache 
“Human Engineering and Climate Change”, Ethics, Policy and the Environment, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2012), 
pp 206-221. For a more critical reading see Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, 
Power, and Subjectivity in the Twentieth-First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
25  Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: The Globalized World in The Twenty-First Century (New York, 
Penguin, 2005). For a critical reading of Friedman see Matthew Sparke, ‘Everywhere But Always Somewhere: 
Critical Geographies of the Global South’. The Global South, Vol 1, No. 1/2 (2007a), pp 117-126; Matthew 
Sparke, ‘Acknowledging Responsibility For Space’. Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 31, N. 3 (2007b), pp 
395-403. 
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millions of people to be expert photographers,’ gloats Apple’s promotional literature 
for its new iSight camera phone – and simulation culture will replace the tedium and 
tensions of daily life in real, physical space.26  Some of this is extravagant fantasy of 
course, but it is not unique to our times or to the latest, new-fangled widgets. 
Billionaire philanthropist, Henry Ford claimed that his automobiles would bring 
harmony and accord to the globe. ‘In Mexico villages fight one another,’ Ford 
announced, but ‘if we could give every man in those villages an automobile, let him 
travel from his home town to another town, and permit him to find out that his 
neighbors at heart were his friends, rather than his enemies, Mexico would be pacified 
for all time.’27  Technologies promise to render complex systems controllable and 
difficult problems tractable.  
 
 This certainly is one of the great appeals of agrarian technology. Researchers 
claim that they can design plants to ‘behave’ in new and better ways, creating a more 
abundant, nutritious, and ‘resilient’ harvest. Pest and disease resistance can be 
introduced to commercial crops. Higher-yielding varieties can be adapted to thrive in 
normal and environmentally stressed soils – seen by some to be the answer to climate 
change and predicted future scarcities. Other scientists promise that a mix of genetic 
selection, vaccines and reformulated animal feeds can limit the methane emitted by 
cows and other ruminants, producing ‘clean’ or ‘climate-safe’ animals for the future.28  
Still others suggest that lab-made ‘nutrition-smart’ foods will eradicate the suffering 
caused by micronutrient deficiencies. ‘Golden Rice’ is the poster child for this process 
of ‘bio-fortification’. Labelled ‘golden’ because of its distinctive hue, enthusiasts 
claim that the new rice will lead the fight against childhood mortality and ‘hidden 
hunger’. The Pope has personally blessed golden rice and powerful voices from 
around the world are presently lobbying for legislative reforms to permit the crops 
rollout.29  
  
There are, however, several problems with this narrative. First and foremost is 
the underlying assumption that technologies are ‘socially neutral.’ In its simplest, 
most reductive form this view assumes that new technologies can be developed in one 
context and then transplanted into another. Take the U.S government’s ‘Feed the 
Future’ initiative. Launched by President Barack Obama after the G-8 members and 
partner countries established a ‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’ 
(hereafter ‘New Alliance’) in 2012, this initiative is devoted to promoting private 
sector investment in agriculture development. To this end, ‘Feed the Future’ is 
cooperating with the Government of India in a ‘Partnership for an Evergreen 
Revolution.’ The expressed goal is to ‘develop, test, and replicate transformative 
technologies to extend food security in India, Africa, and around the world.’30  The 
initiative assumes of course that what global agriculture needs most is a turbo-charged 																																																								
26 Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More From Technology and Less from Ourselves 
(New York: Basic Books, 2011). 
27 Greg Grandin, Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s Forgotten Jungle City. London: Icon 
Books, 2010), p. 47. 
28 Danone, ‘Will “Clean Cows” Change the Face of Agriculture?”, (May 2014), available, 
http://downtoearth.danone.com/2014/05/06/will-clean-cows-change-the-face-of-agriculture/ (accessed 
21 October 2014). 
29 Golden Rice Project. “People Pope Blesses Golden Rice”, (November 2013) 
http://www.goldenrice.org (accessed September 2015) 
30 Feed the Future, Progress Report: Boosting Harvests, Fighting Poverty (Washington DC: USAID 
Publications, 2012), p 21. 
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version of the earlier ‘Green Revolution’ built on a technological package of high-
yielding seeds, regular irrigation, and the application of large quantities of chemicals 
and hydrocarbons to crops. As historian Nick Cullather wryly notes, the ‘new’ Green 
Revolution begins with the careful rewriting of the ‘old’ one. 31   Gone are the 
problems of labour displacement32, soil degradation33, land consolidation34, social 
unrest35 , and the loss of agro-biodiversity.36 It is assumed that newer and better 
technologies can obviate these ‘second tier’ social problems. In the words of a 
flagship World Bank report, ‘The growth of competitive agribusiness in Africa is 
severely constrained by the low use of modern inputs and limited access to improved 
technologies. Wider uptake and more intensive use of improved seed, fertilizer, and 
other inputs would go a long way to closing the African “agricultural performance 
deficit.”’37  
 
The New Alliance is likewise making technology a touchstone of its 
development programmes. Through the brokerage of ‘Cooperation Frameworks’ – 
whereby governments commit to policy reforms and ‘production targets’ and in return 
the private sector promises certain levels of investment and support – New Alliance 
intends to abolish all barriers inhibiting the ‘use, flow and acceptance’ of advanced 
agrarian technologies. In Mozambique, for instance, the government has been asked 
to completely cease the distribution of free, ‘unimproved seeds’ except for pre-
identified staple crops in ‘emergency situations’. In Burkina Faso, Monsanto is 
helping to promote the ‘intensification of agriculture’ through greater mechanization 
and the adoption of Bt Cotton (a transgenic plant engineered to produce insecticide).  
In Ethiopia DuPont are aiding the adoption of hybrid maize. In Tanzania Vodaphone 
is working to ‘optimize’ food supply chains by partnering smallholders and large agri-
businesses. Other ‘Cooperation Frameworks’ include reforms to regulatory and 
legislative frameworks in order to stimulate the uptake of agrochemicals, nutrition 
fortification, and fertilisers.38 Unfortunately, little attention has been given to how 
these frameworks structure and make possible new relations of power in the global 
food economy. 
 
Indeed this assessment of power is what is most strikingly absent from the 
eulogies that usually trail technological advancements. Lewis Mumford, the author of 
the path-breaking book Technics and Civilization, is instructive in this regard for he 
shows us how technologies – from the most primitive to the very polished and 																																																								
31 Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia. (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 265. 
32 Andrew Pearse. Seeds of Plenty, Seeds of Want: Social and Economic Implications of the Green 
Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). 
33 Richard Levins and Richard C. Lewontin The Dialectical Biologist (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985) 
34 Raj Patel, Stuffed and Starved: Markets, Power and the Hidden Battle for the World Food System 
(London: Portobello Books, 2007) 
35 Vandana Shiva, The Violence of the Green Revolution: Third World Agriculture, Ecology and 
Politics (London, Zed Books, 2002) 
36 Gordon Conway. The Doubly Green Revolution: Food for All in the 21st Century (London: Penguin 
Books, 1997) 
37 World Bank, Growing Africa: Unlocking the Potential of Agribusiness (Washington DC: The World 
Bank, 2013), p. xxii. 
38 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, Progress Report Summary, 2013. Available: 
http://new-alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/New-Alliance-Progress-Report-
May2013_compressed.pdf (accessed September 2015). 
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sophisticated – reorient our habits of thought and generate whole new ways of 
ordering social existence. The mechanical clock, he warns us, was ‘not merely a 
means of keeping track of time but of synchronizing the actions of men.’39 With the 
invention of the clock came a new understanding of space, distance and movement 
and a new appreciation of punctuality and time-rationing. In turn this obsession with 
time – including the partitioning of daily life into hours, minutes and seconds – 
birthed a new appreciation of numbers. Henceforth ‘in time-keeping, in trading, in 
fighting men counted numbers,’ until finally, ‘as the habit grew,’ explains Mumford, 
‘only numbers counted’.40  The point is that while we make technology, it in turn 
makes us; it opens up new social relations even as it displaces or suppresses others. 
Taking heed, then, of the social dimensions of technology, let me offer some 
additional reservations about the present technification of agriculture.  
 
First, the potential for technologies to deflect attention from more urgent and 
meaningful social reforms is real and troubling. Again this outcome is not specific to 
the new suite of agrarian technologies. Indeed in Mexico during the first Green 
Revolution the adoption of improved seeds was positioned as a surrogate for more 
difficult (and politically distasteful) land reforms. In a similar way, biofortification 
diverts attention from the primary causes of nutrition deprivation while ‘climate-
smart’ foods (drought tolerant wheat, frost tolerant tomatoes etc.) steer research 
agendas away from mitigation and toward climate-change adaptation and ‘resilience’. 
Lakshman Yapa’s assertion that the reproductive capacity of nature is being replaced 
with the ‘productive capacity’ of industrial inputs is as salient as ever.41 The tendency 
of technology to replace collective forms of care and knowledge sharing can generate, 
directly and inadvertently, new patterns of dependency, or what Yapa helpfully terms 
‘de-development.’42  
 
Second, we ought to question whether imported, labour-saving agrarian 
technologies are a help or hindrance in countries where under and un-employment are 
chronic problems. One need only look to the United States to see how drastic those 
changes can be. At the turn of the twentieth century close to half of the U.S 
population was employed in farming; today less than 1 per cent claim farming as an 
occupation. In addition, the number of farms has fallen by 63 per cent, while the 
average farm size has risen 67 per cent.43  ‘The agriculture of science and industry,’ 
comments Wendell Berry, ‘has served too well the purpose of the industrial economy 
in reducing the number of landowners and self-employed. It has transformed the 
United States from a country of many owners to a country of many employees.’44 
 
A similar drive to ‘rationalise’ African farm holdings – embedding 
mechanisation, commercial fertilisers, irrigation and transgenic seeds – could be 																																																								
39 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, (Chicago, University of Chicago, 2010 [1934]), p. 14. 
40 Ibid., p. 22. 
41 Lakshman Yapa, “What are Improved Seeds? An Epistemology of the Green Revolution”, Economic 
Geography, Vol. 69, No. 3 (1993), pp 254-273. 
42 Lakshman Yapa, “Improved Seeds and Constructed Scarcity”, in Michael Watts and Richard Peet 
(eds.) Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements (London: Routledge, 
1996), p 69-85. 
43 C. Dimitri, A. Efflan and N. Conklin, “The 20th Century Transformation of U.S. Agriculture and 
Farm Policy”, United States Department of Agriculture: Economic Information Bulletin Number 3 
(2005), p. 2. Available: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/59390/2/eib3.pdf. 
44 Wendell Berry, Bringing it to the Table: On Farming and Food (Berkeley: Counterpoint, 2009). 
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catastrophic for the rural poor who typically lack off-farm employment opportunities. 
As Tania Li explains, there is no rosy proletarian future awaiting peasants who are 
driven from their farms.45  For Mike Davis de-peasantisation has generated a vast 
‘global residuum’ of dead labour swelling the slums of the global South – what he 
colourfully describes as a ‘shanty-town world encircling the fortified enclaves of the 
urban rich.’46 
 
Third, it matters greatly to what ends our ‘engineering bias’ is directed. 
Presently, vast sums of research money are spent to design plants better able to 
withstand the heavy spraying of particular herbicides and pesticides – essentially, 
engineering plants to produce a captured market for selling more chemicals. A well-
known example is Monsanto’s transgenic Soya crop, which is engineered to withstand 
the liberal spraying of Monsanto’s herbicide ‘Roundup’. Today ‘Roundup’ is the most 
widely used weed killer in the world. 47   Put simply, the corporate control of 
technological processes means that R&D is increasingly directed to products that are 
commercially successful rather than foods that are nutritionally valuable or indeed 
culturally prized. The corporate capture of technology also means that a small number 
of commercially important crops are targeted for the lion’s share of scientific 
research.48 The foods of the poor – precisely because they are the ‘foods of the poor’ 
– are mostly ignored.  
 
Fourth, it is important to recognize that technologies not only embed 
producers in advanced networks of information, capital, and finance; they also 
recalibrate how ‘users’ (read farmers) think and conduct themselves. Programme 
reports speak of realising social efficiencies, generating better time management, 
instilling a spirit of risk-taking, actuating new modes of perception (seeing traditional 
seeds as ‘bad seeds’ and new seeds as ‘good seeds,’ for example), and fostering 
inventiveness and creative capacities. A company like TechnoServe, a non-profit 
promoting ‘business solutions to poverty’ and part funded by the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, employs ‘transformative technology’ to build and promote 
entrepreneurial values. ‘It is a movement reflecting the time-honored traditions of free 
enterprise, stake, hard work and business acumen,’ writes founder Ed Bullard.49  The 
company believes that real-time information gathering – enabled, for example, by 
mobile phone devices – will engender better decision-making on farms, while new 
data and information services will help governments combat fraud and manage 
environmental risks.50  In this sense technology is instrumental to what Ilcan and 																																																								
45 See especially Tania Murray Li, “Exit from Agriculture: A Step Forward or a Step Backward for the 
Rural Poor”, Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol, 36, No. 3 (2009a), pp 629–36; Tania Murray Li,  “To 
Make Live or Let Die? Rural Dispossession and the Protection of Surplus Populations”, Antipode, Vol. 
41, No. S1 (2009b): 66–93. 
46 Mike Davis, “Planet of Slums”, New Left Review, Vol 26, March/April (2004), p. 27.  
47 David Nally, “The Biopolitics of Food Provisioning”, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, Vol. 36, No, 1 (2011), pp 37-53. 48	Here we would do well to remember Paul Virilio’s memorable aphorism: ‘When you invent the ship, 
you also invent the shipwreck.’ Paul Virilio, Politics of the Very Worst (New York: Semiotext(e)), p. 
89	
49 TechnoServe, Strategic Plan 2013-2017. (2013), p 6.. Available: 
http://www.technoserve.org/files/downloads/2013-2017_strategic-plan.pdf (accessed September 2015). 
50 See for example the 2014 report from New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, Progress 
Report 2013-14, available: https://new-
alliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/072814_NewAlliance_FinalC_508.pdf (accessed September 
2015) 
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Phillips term ‘developmentality’. 51   It actively assembles the idea of the ‘good 
worker’ and the ‘good society,’ and as such technology leads the charge in the desired 
metamorphosis from traditional institutions and values to modern systems and 
processes. In short, technology is envisaged as a kind of cultural elixir, uniquely 
capable of modernising the minds and habits of the poor.52  
 
Fifth and finally, discussions about agricultural technology rarely if ever 
broach the vexed issue of ownership. We need to ask who really stands to benefit 
from the new technologies and their intellectual property (IP) regimes, not whether 
the technologies are in themselves ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  It is the social dimension of 
technology that really matters – and if recent practice is any guide, then poor 
countries have cause to be concerned. In North America the big seed and chemical 
companies have not hesitated to sue farmers who they claim have contravened 
company patents. In self-provisioning societies – where an informal moral economy 
of seed saving and sharing prevails53 – patents threaten to squeeze peasants into new 
forms of debt peonage and ‘bioserfdom.’54  Seeds that were once free and exchanged 
through the commons become subject to commercial exchange and transaction. In 
short, trade displaces mutual aid. 
 
In this respect it is certainly significant that an early promise by New Alliance 
to explore alternatives to commercial IP rights (copyleft, open access, and the like) 
were after ‘further assessment’ dropped on the grounds that ‘there is little benefit in 
this approach to development.’55  Unfortunately the report fails to specify why non-
commercial, ‘open-access’ licenses were deemed prejudicial to development, but one 
likely reason is that ‘benefit’ here is narrowly construed as profit for private seed 
companies. 56  DuPont, a close partner in New Alliance’s country programmes, 
encapsulates this worldview very well:  
 
The protection of IP around the world, in all its various forms, will 
encourage more research and development, lead to better products, and 
facilitate much needed trade. Innovations flourish in countries that offer 
strong IP rights. A lack of enforceable IP regimes in developing nations 
will also prevent their farmers from obtaining the best, new products, such 
as biotechnology traits that improve the nutritional quality of plants or 
advances in traditional breeding that can help create drought-resistant 
plants.57 																																																								
51 Suzan Ilcan and Lynne Phillips, “Developmentalities and Calculative Practices: The Millennium 
Development Goals” Antipode, Vol, 42, No. 4 (2010), pp 844–874. 
52 Nick Cullather, “‘The Target is the People’: Representations of the Village in Modernization and 
U.S. National Security Doctrine”, Cultural Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2006), pp 29–48. 
53 Olivier de Schutter, “Seed Policies and the Right to Food”, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, to the 64th session of the General Assembly [UN doc. 
A/64/170] (2009), p. 20. 
54 Jack Kloppenburg Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology (Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), p. 322. 
55 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, “Progress Report Summary, 2013”, op. cit., p. 9 
[Annex 4]. 
56  Jack Kloppenburg, “Re-purposing the Master’s Tools: the Open Source Seed Initiative and the 
Struggle for Seed Sovereignty”, The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 41, No. 6 (2014), pp. 1225-1246.	
57 DuPont Advisory Committee, Agricultural Innovation and Productivity for the 21st century: Report 
and Recommendations (2011), p. 13, available: http://read.uberflip.com/i/33253 (accessed September 
2015). 
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As the above makes clear, the quest is not simply to embed new-fangled technologies 
in traditional social structures, but rather to fashion a brave new world in which 
private property rights and rent-seeking practices are normalized. Technology here is 
not used to service human needs or create a more equitable social support system; 
rather, it is deployed for the more narrow and utilitarian purpose of capitalist market 
creation. As others have shown, in agricultural the historical task of commodification 
can be quickened either by wresting control of production from farmers (via 
mechanisation or the commercialisation of seeds, for example) or by creating the 
political and legal instruments for private markets to flourish.58  For these reasons it is 
important to distinguish between technology (which again, intrinsically, is neither 
‘good’ nor ‘bad’) and its social functions. Technology can be ‘pro-poor’; 
unfortunately it is rarely so when powerful business interests control both R&D and 
product rollout. 
 
MYTH #2: FOOD INSECURITY RESULTS FROM ARRESTED 
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Today’s new green revolutionaries openly discuss wholesale ‘transformational 
changes’ in ways that would have embarrassed even the most ardent Rostovian ‘take 
off’ theorist of the 1960s. ‘Historical trends are not, I believe, a speed limit on the 
future,’ declares James Borel, an Executive Vice President at DuPont.59  Bill and 
Melinda Gates describe themselves as ‘impatient optimists’. ‘The world is getting 
better, but it's not getting better for everyone, and it’s not getting better fast enough,’ 
remarked Bill Gates in a speech to global leaders at Davos.60  Thus the dominant 
concern is not whether the theory of historical development is right or wrong, but 
whether the process of transformation can be super-charged and rendered ‘catalytic’ 
for the sake of the poor. This ‘impatience’ for change is evident in the choice of 
words. The avatars of AGRA and New Alliance picture development as a noble 
struggle against the deadening weight of tradition – thus they face ‘blockages,’ 
‘constraints’ and ‘barriers’ that must be torn down – and they depict progress as a 
matter of ‘leveraging’ and ‘scaling up’ their ideas and activities. Such rhetoric depicts 
‘poverty’ as a noun and ‘assistance’ as a verb. They are passive; we are active. They 
‘lack’; we ‘impart’. 
 But what is it that the poor and benighted so obviously lack? Or to say this 
differently, how exactly does development construct its object?61 A co-authored paper 																																																								
58 Richard C. Lewontin, “The Maturing of Capitalist Agriculture: Farmer as Proletarian”, in Fred 
Magdoff, John Bellamy Foster and Frederick H. Buttel  (eds.) Hungry for profit: the agribusiness 
threat to farmers, food, and the environment, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000), p. 93–106. 
59 James C. Borel, Agricultural Innovation in the 21st Century: Optimistic Science Meets Global 
Demand, (2010), p. 5. Available: 
http://us.vocuspr.com/Newsroom/ViewAttachment.aspx?SiteName=DupontEMEA&Entity=PRAsset&
AttachmentType=F&EntityID=119107&AttachmentID=c3417907-46f4-420e-875c-7676d2fe72f7 
(accessed September 2015). 
60 Bill Gates, “A New Approach to Capitalism in the 21st Century”, Remarks by Bill Gates, Chairman, 
Microsoft Corporation at the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, January 24 2008. 
Available: http://news.microsoft.com/2008/01/24/bill-gates-world-economic-forum-2008/ (accessed 
September 2015). Emphasis added. 
61 Arturo Escobar, “Planning”, in Wolfgang Sachs (ed.) The Development Dictionary: A Guide to 
Knowledge as Power, (London: Zed Books, 2010), p. 145-160. 
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by staff at AGRA and the Rockefeller Foundation published in 2008 affords us some 
insight. Hobbling African progress is a depressing list of problems including poor 
soils, ‘traditional crop varieties,’ small and shrinking plots of land, scarce and 
unreliable water supplies, crop losses (from pests and pathogens), inequitable land 
distribution, poor transportation infrastructures and ‘inefficient’ market conditions.62 
Omitted from this taxing list of problems is any mention of the devastation imposed 
on African farming by Western policies, first under the auspices of colonial rule and 
later via programmes of structural adjustment imposed by the International Financial 
Institutions – not to mention the skewed system of international trade that forces 
‘economic liberalisation’ on poor countries whilst permitting protectionism and 
subsidies for rich ones.63 This is not to argue that the causes of poverty identified by 
the authors at AGRA and the Rockefeller Foundation have no basis, but rather, 
following Thomas Pogge, I want to insist that those ‘causes themselves have 
causes.’64 It is striking how frequently African poverty is radically endogenized, a 
move which creates the impression that the West has little or nothing to do with those 
circumstances. Furthermore, if poverty is defined as the absence of certain things 
(credit, fertilizer, improved seeds, entrepreneurialism etc.), rather than the presence of 
other things (debt bondage, financial speculation, agro-fuels policy, state 
disinvestment, etc.) then it is easy to see how development sets as its target the rapid 
remedy of those imputed deficiencies. Indeed the ‘impatience’ for change reflects the 
self-assurance that the diagnosis and projected cure are both sacred and 
unimpeachable. 
 In a speech delivered at Stanford University, Cargill’s Chairman and CEO, 
Greg Page addressed the same problem, but in a different way. If we are to feed the 
planet, he commented, we are going to have to make farms, particularly small farms, 
more productive. But how are we to accomplish this feat, wondered Page, without 
generating widespread, destabilising rural to urban migration as some farmers 
predictably lose out to rationalisation? For Page modernisation is a zero-sum game 
because there are real and important costs to keeping the ‘inefficient’ peasant on the 
land – what Page telling terms a ‘rural sociology premium.’65 That the CEO of Cargill 
can lecture the public about what he elsewhere terms the ‘Solomonic burden’ of 
retaining smallholdings, while failing to mention the damage caused by corporate 
practices, says a lot about the moral ledger of big agro-companies.66 In fact one can 
read through the whole of Page’s public address without ever appreciating his firms 
role in global commodities speculation 67  and the production of agro-fuels, 68  two 																																																								
62 Gary Toenniessen, Akinwumi Adesina and Joseph De Vries, “Building an Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa”, Annals of the New York Academy of Science, Vol. 1136 (2008), p. 233. 
63 Walden Bello, The Food Wars (London: Verso, 2009); Ray Bush, Poverty and Neoliberalism: 
Persistence and Reproduction in the Global South, (London: Pluto Press, 2007) 
64 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms. 
Cambridge: Polity, 2002), p.  14. 
65 Greg Page, ‘Food Security: Balancing the Race to Caloric Sufficiency with Rural Sociology’. Speech 
at Stanford University, Program on Food Security and the Environment, (February 2011) available: 
http://www.cargill.com/news/speeches-presentations/food-security-balancing-caloricsufficiency-
ruralsociology/index.jsp (accessed September 2015).  
66 Greg Page, “Smallholders: Big Impact”, Speech at the World Food Prize's Norman E. Borlaug 
Dialogue, (October 2010), available:  http://www.cargill.com/news/speeches-
presentations/smallholders-speech-at-world-food-prize/ (accessed September 2015). 
67 One report castigates food speculation on the grounds that it has ‘no economic value because unlike 
stocks and bonds it does not place capital in countries or businesses. ’ Food Watch, The Hunger-
makers: How Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs and Other Financial Institutions are Speculating with 
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trades that have been repeatedly linked to food price spikes and the surge in global 
hunger. Instead Page concludes with an appeal to history; indeed his language recalls 
colonial descriptions of peasants ‘transitioning’ into sturdy yeomen and day labourers, 
a violent and wrenching process, sanitized, then and now, as stadial progress.69 ‘We 
must find a way to allow supplies of food to increase in the medium term until,’ he 
says, ‘in the long term, smallholders can travel down to a more natural free market 
path. History shows us that this can be a painful journey, but to evolve in sustainable 
agriculture attention must be given to the whole issue of revenue adequacy.’70 There 
is a lot of ideology packed into that little word ‘evolve.’ 
The position of Big Philanthropy is also noteworthy on this point. While the 
Gates Foundation publicly professes its support for smallholder agriculture, a leaked 
strategy document suggests that this position not as straightforward as it first seems: 
‘Over time, this [agrarian strategy] will require some degree of land mobility and a 
lower percentage of total employment involved in direct agricultural production.’ As 
authors Raj Patel, Eric Holt-Gimenez and Annie Shattuck comment: ‘“Land mobility” 
is an Orwellian term meaning the land stays where it is but the people on it are driven 
off. The foundation stands behind this idea, saying that peasants will head to cities 
“because there are a lot of them who don’t want to be farmers [and] people make their 
own choices.”’71 The Gates Foundation’s vision stands in marked contrast to the 
views of the UN Rapporteur on the Right to Food: ‘Only by supporting small 
producers can we help break the vicious cycle that leads from rural poverty to the 
expansion of urban slums, in which poverty breeds more poverty.’72 
  Whereas Greg Page and the Gates Foundation merely imply that smallholders 
are an encumbrance to progress, Paul Collier, an Oxford economist and author of the 
best-selling book The Bottom Billion, puts the matter bluntly. ‘Peasant farming is not 
well suited to innovation and investment,’ he says. Indeed for Collier the ‘most 
realistic way’ of drawing down global food prices ‘is to replicate the Brazilian model 
of large, technologically sophisticated agro-companies.’73 Continuing in the pages of 
Foreign Policy, Collier goes on to mock ‘the middle- and upper class love affair with 																																																																																																																																																														
Food at the Expense of the Poorest (Berlin: Thilo Bode, 2011), p. 65 
68 A practice that Tony Weis says requires almost as much, if not more input energy as comes out as 
liquid ‘bioenergy.’ Tony Weis. The Ecological Hoofprint: The Global Burden of Industrial Livestock 
(London: Zed Books, 2013), p. 88. 
69 Compare, for example, the words of the English reformer George Nicholls writing about nineteenth-
century Ireland: ‘By the term “transition period,” I mean to indicate that season of change from the 
system of small holdings, allotments, and subdivision of land, which now prevails in Ireland, to the 
better practice of day-labourer for wages, and to that dependence on daily labour for support. This 
transition period is, I believe, generally beset with difficulty and suffering. It was so in England; and it 
is, and for a time will probably continue to be so, in Ireland.’ George Nicholls, “Report of George 
Nicholls on Poor Laws Ireland”, British Parliamentary Papers Vol. 69, No. 51 (London: HMSO, 
1837) p. 236. See David Nally, Human Encumbrances: Political Violence and the Great Irish Famine 
(Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press). 
70 Greg Page, “Smallholders: Big Impact”, op. cit. 
71 Raj Patel, Eric Holt-Giménez and Annie Shattuck, “Ending Africa’s Hunger”, The Nation 
(September 21 2009) available: http://www.thenation.com/article/ending-africas-hunger#. (accessed 
September 2015). 
72 Olivier de Schutter, “Agroecology and the Right to Food” Report Presented at the 16th Session of 
the United Nations Human Rights Council [UN doc. A/HRC/16/49] (2011), p. 5.  
73 Cited in, Fred Pearce, The Landgrabbers: The New Fight Over Who Owns the Earth (Eden Project 
Books, London, 2013), p. 397. 
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peasant agriculture’ and the view that ‘peasants, like pandas, are to be preserved.’74 
Given the present food crisis, Collier announced, support for small-scale farming 
reflects a ‘retreat into romanticism.’ In his view ‘the world needs more commercial 
farms, not less.’75 
 
Collier’s comments give us an insight on the discursive strategies employed 
by the savants of big agribusiness. The first step is to accuse smallholders of being 
‘inefficient’ and ‘unproductive’. Next they claim that the champions of small-scale 
farming are schmaltzy, desk-bound urbanites detached from the realities of farm work 
and wistfully preaching the return of an ‘Old Macdonald’ bucolic ideal. To these 
desk-bound urbanites the peasant is a ‘noble savage’ farming an unspoiled rural 
paradise – a view that critics easily paint as naïve, if not delusional. Finally, critics 
such as Collier argue that the world faces a food crisis of such magnitude that it 
would be immoral not to support large-scale industrial farming and the expansion of 
‘sophisticated’ agro-tech companies. In this framing the smallholder is a symbol of 
obsolescence, no more capable of agricultural improvement than the dodo was 
capable of flight. It follows, naturally enough, that smallholders must be removed 
from the land before productivity can flourish and yields can increase. As Wendell 
Berry astutely remarks, typically this kind of judgement is passed on ‘by people who 
probably would not have given such advice if they were themselves in a position to 
suffer from it.’76 
 
 The misanthropy aside, this ‘peasant-is-obsolete’ argument simply ignores all 
the science that shows that peasant-based smallholder agriculture is more than capable 
of feeding the planet. For example, a global report by the IAASTD, a high-profile 
panel comprising of over 400 scientists from more than 80 participating nations and 
which took four years to complete, concluded that ‘a focus on small-scale sustainable 
agriculture, locally adapted seed and ecological farming better address the 
complexities of climate change, hunger, poverty and productive demands on 
agriculture in the developing world.’77 Tellingly the Monsanto Company, an erstwhile 
partner in this study, withdrew its support once these scientific findings were 
revealed.78  
The UK’s Foresight Report on The Future of Food and Farming considers the 
smallholder ‘an important component of both hunger and poverty alleviation,’ while 
the UN’s International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), normally a 
restrained and conservative organisation, is on record as saying that small farmers are 
part of the solution, not the problem.79 Similarly several academic studies echo these 																																																								
74 Paul Collier, “The Politics of Hunger: How Illusion and Greed Fan the Food Crisis” Foreign Affairs 
(November/December 2008) available: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64607/paul-collier/the-
politics-of-hunger (accessed September 2015). 
75 Ibid. 
76 Berry, op. cit. p. 41. 
77 Raj Patel, Eric Holt-Giménez and Annie Shattuck, “Ending Africa’s Hunger,” op. cit; Jules Pretty, 
“Can Ecological Agriculture Feed Nine Billion People?” in Fred Magdoff and Brian Tokar (eds.) 
Agriculture and the Food Crisis: Conflict, Resistance, and Renewal (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 2010), p. 298. 
78 Eric Holt-Giménez and Raj Patel, Food Rebellions! Crisis and the Hunger for Justice (Nairobi: 
Pambazuka Press, 2009) p. 129. 
79 Foresight, The Future of Food and Farming: Final Project Report (London: The Government Office 
for Science, 2011) p. 25; IFAD. Viewpoint: Smallholders Can Feed the World (Rome IFAD 
Publication, 2011). 
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conclusions, highlighting how smallholders from around the world are pioneering 
innovative, low-external-input techniques that are proving crucial to preserving eco-
systems and mitigating climate change. ‘Rather than treating smallholder farmers as 
beneficiaries of aid,’ writes Olivier de Schutter, ‘they should be seen as experts with 
knowledge that is complementary to formalized expertise.’ 80  Theses studies are 
disregarded no doubt because they challenge the loud modernization chorus that 
champions large-scale farming and agro-companies and sees smallholders as atavistic 
relics obstructing the deferred development of the global borderlands.  When viewed 
from the throne of Solomon the world is full of subjects who ought to do what the 
venerable and wise have decided is best for them. 
MYTH #3: FOOD INSECURITY IS PRIMARILY AN EXPRESSION 
OF SCARCITY 
 
More than three decades ago Amartya Sen (at the time a Professor of Economics at 
Oxford, and today a Professor of Economics and Philosophy at Harvard), published a 
book titled Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. The aim 
of Sen’s book was neatly stated on the first page: 
 
Starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough food to 
eat.  It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food to eat.  
While the latter can be a cause of the former, it is but one of many 
possible causes. Whether and how starvation relates to food supply is a 
matter for factual investigation.81 
 
In case study after case study – Bengal in 1943, Ethiopia in the 1973-74, Bangladesh 
1974, and the famines in the countries of the African Sahel in the 1970s – Sen showed 
that food availability decline was neither the original nor primary cause of distress. 
Sen postulated instead that people starve when either their ‘endowments’ (that is, the 
sum total of their resources) or their ‘entitlement set’ (that is, the bundle of goods and 
services that a person may legally exploit) shift to such a precipitous extent that they 
can no longer obtain sufficient sustenance.  In short, Sen shatters the common view 
that food scarcity is a necessary precursor to starvation. 
 
While Sen was awarded a Nobel Prize for his contributions to economic 
theory, the conclusions he reached were not exactly novel. Irish nationalist John 
Mitchel (1815–1875) described the Great Irish Famine as an ‘artificial’ scarcity. It 
was caused, so Mitchel alleged, by the punitive reactions of the British government, 
including the failure to prohibit the exportation of foods as famine conditions 
worsened. ‘Ireland exported four quarters of grain for every quarter she imported,’ 
Michel wrote in his Jail Journal, a bitter account of his imprisonment and 
transportation to Van Diemen’s Land for insurrectionary activities.82   
 
From the standpoint of global history, the Mitchelite claim is in fact 
astonishingly common.  Writing in 1516 the Tudor lawyer and statesmen, Sir Thomas 																																																								
80 Olivier de Schutter, “Agroecology and the Right to Food” op. cit., p. 18. 
81 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlements and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1981) p. 1. My emphasis. 
82 John Mitchel, Jail Journal (Dublin, M.H. Gill & Son, Ltd, 1921) p. 40. 
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Moore (1478-1535), drew attention to the practice of hoarding and collusion among 
grain dealers.  ‘Take a barren year of failed harvests when many thousands of men 
have been carried off by hunger, ’ Moore exhorted.  ‘If at the end of the famine the 
barns of the rich were searched, I daresay enough grain would be found in them to 
save the lives of all those who died from starvation and disease, if it had been divided 
equally among them.’83  As early as 650 BC the Chinese minister Kuang Chung 
complained: ‘That people are starving for lack of food is because there is grain 
hoarded in storehouses of the rich instead of in government granaries … if the ruler 
fails to take heed, then the traders wander in markets and take advantage of want 
among people.’84 A sixteenth-century play that took for its theme the 1381 Peasants’ 
Revolt in England includes these terse but resonant lines: 
 
And at last moulder into common clay. 
Why then these vain distinctions! – bears not the earth,  
Food in abundance? – must your granaries 
O'erflow with plenty, while the poor man starves?85 
 
This brief historical excursion is not meant to undermine the scholarly 
contributions of Sen. On the contrary, Sen was able to prove what others had mostly 
intuited, and arguably no one before or since has demolished the argument that 
hunger implies a decline in food availability with the same precision, clarity and 
power. My point, rather, is to show how little a dent this scholarship has had on 
popular appreciations of ‘food insecurity.’ The so-called food crisis of 2007-08 is a 
case in point. In 2008 the FAO reported that as a result of food price spikes and the 
global financial crisis a further 75 million people were added to the hunger ledger, 
with the global figure for those experiencing hunger surpassing the one billion mark 
in 2009.86  For the most part, as we shall see, the narrative to explain this surge in 
‘food insecurity’ was one of demand outstripping supply.  
 
One popular tack is to blame the new growth economies, particularly consumer 
demand in China and India, for causing a drawdown in global food supplies. In a 
missive to potential investors, Niels Jensen, a partner at Absolute Return, a London-
based investment firm, warns of an imminent ‘protein bomb,’ as the rising middle 
classes of Asia move from a grain-based diet to a food regime dominated by protein, 
sugar and fats.  The analysis is meant both to shock and prime investors.87 After all, as 
demand grows and supply tightens the price of agricultural goods will increase, 
generating large profits for investors willing to back the ‘bull run’ in soft 
commodities. But the larger claim that Asian consumption is generating global 
shortages is echoed again and again in policy circles and in global media. 
 
Industry voices have also joined this chorus of supply-side explanations. Global 
Harvest Initiative (GHI), ‘a private-sector voice for productivity growth throughout 																																																								
83 Cited in, Pierre Spitz, “The Right to Food in Historical Perspective”, Food Policy 10 (1985), p. 306. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Peter Linebaugh, Stop Thief! The Commons, Enclosures and Resistance. Oakland CA: PM Press, 
2014) p. 172. 
86 FAO, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2008 (Rome: Organization of the United Nations, 
2008). 
87 Niels Jensen, The Absolute Return Letter March 2012: The Protein Bomb, available: 
http://www.arpinvestments.com/downloads/Absolute-Return-
Letter/2012/The_Absolute_Return_Letter_0312.pdf (accessed September 2015) 
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the agricultural value chain,’ has loudly called for at least a doubling of food output 
by 2050. Each year GHI publishes its trademarked ‘Gap Report’ which aims to 
quantify global agricultural productivity as well as establish industry benchmarks to 
meet ‘future needs.’88 Similarly in 2008 the Monsanto Company announced its new 
Sustainable Yield Initiative (SYI). The company’s promotional material highlights the 
gravity of supply constraints: ‘In seven of the last eight years, the world has 
consumed more grain than it produced. Experts now predict our planet will need to 
double agricultural output by 2050 to feed a growing population. By some estimates, 
that means producing ‘more food in the next 50 years than has been grown in the last 
10,000 years.’ 89  For Syngenta, the Swiss seed and agrichemical company, this 
predication means that ‘enough is [now] a moving target.’90 
 
‘Demand is in the hunt for supply,’ James Borel of DuPont told an audience at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in June 2010.91 And because only a small 
percentage of food is traded internationally, Borel reasoned, productivity increases are 
going to have to happen where the hungry live: ‘The geography of agriculture is too-
often overlooked. We speak of the looming food “gap” between production and 
population. We don’t speak enough of the potential “mismatch” between the location 
of production and the location of people.’92  
 
It turns out that others had already being thinking hard about the significance of 
geography. In 2006 the Rockefeller Foundation published a seminal report entitled 
Africa’s Turn: New Green Revolution for the 21st Century. The report is a backwards 
look at achievements of ‘venturesome philanthropy’ and its much-publicized role in 
more than doubling global food production in the twenty years from 1965 to 1985. 
But as the report laments, the Green Revolution had a geographical blind spot – ‘it 
stopped at Africa.’ What follows is a clarion call ‘for a fundamental transformation of 
Africa’s agricultural economy’ to address widespread hunger and rural poverty.93 The 
very same year that call was answered by Bill and Melinda Gates who joined forces 
with the Rockefeller Foundation to sponsor a new philanthropic plan: ‘The Alliance 
for a Green Revolution in Africa’ (AGRA). Much like the industry voices cited 
above, AGRA repeatedly links production shortages to hunger and poverty, as though 
the first automatically causes the second: ‘Africa’s agricultural production falls far 
short of its potential. Cereal yields are one-quarter the world average. For decades 
African agriculture has been neglected, and the cost of this neglect is now being borne 
by her people. Nearly 220 million people are hungry. National grain reserves in most 
African countries are too low for comfort.’94   																																																								
88 GHI, Gap Report™: Global Revolutions in Agriculture: The Challenge and Promise of 2050. (2014) 
available: www.globalharvestinitiative.org/GAP/2014_GAP_Report.pdf (accessed September 2015). 
89 See comments available at: http://www.monsantoafrica.com/sustainability/produce_more/default.asp 
(accessed January 30 2015). Syngenta make the same claim on their website. 
http://www.syngenta.com/global/corporate/en/goodgrowthplan/challenges/Pages/grow-more-food.aspx 
(accessed September 2015) 
90 See comments available at: 
http://www.syngenta.com/global/corporate/en/goodgrowthplan/challenges/Pages/grow-more-food.aspx 
(accessed September 2015). 
91 Borel, op. cit., p. 3. 
92 Ibid. p. 10. 
93 Rockefeller Foundation, Africa’s Turn: A New Green Revolution for the 21st Century (New York: 
Rockefeller Publications, 2006), p. 9.  
94 AGRA, Building on the New Momentum in African Agriculture (Nairobi: AGRA Publications, 
2008), p. ix. 
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An important World Bank enquiry into the phenomenon of land grabbing partly 
excused the practice in Africa on the assumption that the potential surge in production 
outweighed the risks involved. ‘None of the African countries of most interest to 
investors,’ the report asserts, ‘is now achieving more than 30 per cent of the potential 
yield on currently cultivated areas.’95 Tellingly, when quizzed about the propriety of 
land deals, Bill Gates seemed equally unperturbed. ‘Many of those land deals are 
beneficial,’ he answered, ‘and it would be too bad if some were held back because of 
Western groups’ ways of looking at things. Whenever somebody invests in Africa and 
actually builds infrastructure in Africa, they’re the ones who are at risk. You can't 
take the infrastructure home!’ 96  These kinds of means-ends calculations (which 
display such a cavalier attitude toward the social and environmental fallout from land 
grabs) become more common when the focus is directed so resolutely toward the 
narrow utilitarian goal of yield and productivity increases. 
 
Over and over again we see that scarcity is presented as the true index of 
hunger. When viewed this way, the food crisis must be addressed through greater 
investment, which automatically generates more production, higher yields and less 
hunger.  But is this picture of the food crisis accurate?  
Let us deal first and only briefly with the ‘protein bomb’ claim. No question 
dietary transition is an important structural feature of the global food economy as the 
‘grain-livestock industry’ aggressively pursues urban Asian markets and big food 
retailers move to shape middle class tastes (the fact that our tastes are shaped by the 
food and advertising industries is conveniently left out of accounts that present 
‘dietary transition’ as both natural and inevitable). Yet the claim that demand 
increases from India and China have produced global food scarcity does not hold up. 
In fact comparing changes in the global grain situation in 2007–8 (the beginning of 
the food crisis) with the situation in 2008–9 (when in fact the food crisis grew more 
intense for many developing countries) economist Jayati Ghosh concludes that 
‘aggregate food use has increased very little, and less than both production and 
supply.97 One important reason for this is that China and India continued to exhibit 
falling food grain consumption both in per capita terms as well as in the aggregate, 
completely belying the view that increased demand from these countries had 
contributed even partially to the global price rise.’ According to Ghosh the real 
culprits are financial deregulation (which amplifies global commodity speculation), 
the diversion of grain acreage and food crops for agro-fuel production (and the cost-
push effects this diversion induced), and the increased vulnerability of poorer 
countries’ farming sectors to global financial movements and shocks (global 
economic integration means that governments often experience weak sovereignty 
when it comes to buffering their economies from food crises). In short, for Ghosh the 																																																								
95 K. Deininger, D. Byerlee (with J. Linsay, A. Norton, H. Selod, and M. Stickler), Rising Global 
Interest in Farmland: Can it Yield Sustainable and Equitable Benefits? Washington DC: The World 
Bank, 2011), p. xiv; Tania Murray Li, “Centering labor in the land grab debate”, The Journal of 
Peasant Studies Vol. 38, No.2 (2011), p. 294. 
96 Cited in, All Africa, “‘Best Chance” to End Polio: Bill Gates Promotes Vaccines and Food Programs 
to Attack Poverty”, (February  2011), available: http://allafrica.com/stories/201102091101.html 
(accessed September 2015). 
97 Jayati Ghosh, “The Unnatural Coupling: Food and Global Finance”, Journal of Agrarian Change, 
Vol. 10, No. 1 (2010), p. 80. 
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food crisis is ‘policy-determined,’ not scarcity-driven.98 
Let us now take the claim that we face imminent global scarcity, and 
consequently, low-yield countries ought to be targeted for productivity increases. Can 
we really feed ‘three extra Indias’ by 2050, to cite the alarmist language of the 
Economist magazine (viz., 2 billion extra people plus the one billion who presently 
experience hunger)?99   
The fact is that the world already produces enough food to feed everyone on the 
planet.100 Indeed by some estimates there is more than enough food to feed the planet 
twice over101, especially if one takes into account food waste (estimates suggest that 
as much as one third of all food produced globally is wasted) and the use of crops to 
fuel cars rather than feed people (Lester Brown calculates that the grain required to 
fill a 95-litre fuel tank of an SUV is enough to feed an average person for an entire 
year).102 Furthermore, the call to ‘double food production,’ repeated ad nauseam in 
industry, policy and media circles, is itself problematic. The claim appears to have 
originated with the FAO, but as Isobel Tomlinson shows, the report in question 
actually states that the scale of increase would necessarily depend on the food groups 
involved.103 If we assume as natural and inevitable that we will continue to consume 
more meat, fish and eggs and that agro-fuels are here to stay … well, then, yes, yield 
increases seem very likely.104 But those assumptions depend on prioritising the energy 
and food needs of the affluent – something we ought to be upfront about, instead of 
hiding behind humanitarian rhetoric, which implies that our primary goal is to ‘feed 
the global poor.’ 
Most importantly, as Tomlinson again points out, the FAO’s attempt to 
estimate future production trends was never intended to serve as a ‘normative policy 
goal.’ So why do industry voices insist on misquoting the projections, while failing to 
discuss, say, the conclusions of the ‘High Level Expert Forum,’ part of the FAO’s 
Committee on World Food Security?105 Writing in 2009 that panel said: 
																																																								
98 Ibid., p. 73. 
99 The Economist, “How Much Is Enough?” (February 2011)  available: 
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Earth Policy Institute, 2012). 
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https://www.soilassociation.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qbavgJQPY%2Fc%3D&tabid=390 
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(2014) pp 924-929 
105 Isobel Tomlinson, “Doubling Food Production”, p. 82. 
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During the recent decade global food production has generally followed a 
positive growth trend, even on a per-caput basis. Nevertheless, the number 
of chronically undernourished has further grown, not fallen. The 
extraordinary increase of hunger during the recent food crisis in 
2007/2008 occurred in spite of a record cereal harvest in 2008. This is a 
clear reminder that ensuring an adequate supply of food at the 
aggregate level, globally or nationally, does not guarantee that all 
people have enough to eat and that hunger will be eliminated.106 
 
The idea of absolute scarcity is a canard. Amartya Sen described it well when he said 
it was like looking for a black cat in a dark room that is not there. People starve not 
because of a shortage of foods but because of other factors. The continual focus on 
scarcity and yield-boosting programmes means that those ‘other factors’ are excluded 
from rational discussion – that is, when we are talking about how to increase yields 
we are not talking about whether there is a need to increase yields. Furthermore the 
entire discussion leaves untouched the assumption that an increase in calorific 
availability will translate into a nutritional adequate diet for those who are currently 
malnourished. When so many go hungry under conditions of global surplus (not to 
mention the many more who suffer adverse health caused by overconsumption) this 
supposition seems naïve at best and at worst knowingly disingenuous. We need to call 
off the search party for the missing black cat. 
 
MYTH #4: FULLY LIBERALIZED MARKETS ARE AN 
ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT  
 
In 1944 the Viennese economic historian Karl Polanyi published his magisterial book, 
The Great Transformation. 107  In this book Polanyi pointed out that for much of 
human history markets were ‘embedded’ in society by which he meant that the 
original and primary function of markets was to aid and abet society – markets 
encouraged human interaction and mutual flourishing. Then in the nineteenth century 
comes the ‘great transformation’ that gives Polanyi’s book its title. Slowly political 
forces favouring market liberalisation (‘free trade’) gather momentum and move to 
‘dis-embed’ the economy from society, to the point that the economy now drives 
society rather than the other way around. For Polanyi the ‘great transformation’ turns 
society into a ‘mere adjunct’ of the market. Commercial values now reign supreme. 
 
In actual fact the ‘great transformation’ is neither as extreme nor as complete 
as this stylized reading of Polanyi might suggest. In practice, moments of ‘dis-
embedding’ are frequently followed by episodes of ‘re-embedding’ as the social and 
environmental costs of extreme market liberalisation are judged to be too high. The 
history of free market capitalism then is rather like the stretching of an elastic band (to 
use Fred Block’s splendid metaphor in his introduction to Polanyi’s text) – 
liberalisation stretches the social fabric to a ‘break point’ where the only viable option 
is to contract, thus re-embedding market forces in the ‘social shell,’ in order to save 																																																								
106 HLEF, How to Feed the World in 2050 (Rome: FAO Publications) p. 27, available: 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/expert_paper/How_to_Feed_the_World_in_2050.pd
f (accessed September 2015) 
107 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2001).  
	 22	
the band of society from shattering altogether.108 Seen this way, fully liberalized 
markets – or what is sometimes referred to as ‘free market fundamentalism’ – are a 
form of thanatopolitics.109 Its complete realisation represents nothing less than an 
existential threat to planetary life. 
 
For the purposes of this discussion I want to argue that the consensus I have 
been discussing marks an attempt to dis-embed the market from all remaining social 
constraints (perhaps this explains why ‘resilience’ is such a buzzword across the 
social and natural sciences today.  The question seems to be: how far can we pull the 
band before it snaps, or how ‘resilient’ is the elastic to the expansionary forces of 
capitalism?)  
 
It is striking how frequently such thinking is boxed in the high-minded 
rhetoric of global engagement and benevolent assistance. Richard Ferguson, head of 
global agriculture at the investment bank Renaissance Capital, believes that ‘a free 
market with transparent pricing, enforceable property rights and liberalized trade 
would solve just about every agricultural problem under the sun.’110 ‘We need to get 
the economics right,’ say DuPont, ‘we must incentivize the right kind of private 
behavior (and do it in the right ways) … Only within a healthy marketplace will 
farmers reap the benefits of unlocked innovation, fair and open competition, increased 
choice and continued growth in international trade.’111 According to a GHI report 
published in 2011, ‘trade is the mechanism that links supply to demand, and trade 
liberalization plays an essential role in promoting global food security by making the 
international food system more efficient.’112  
 
Similarly a key objective of the AGRA is ‘to transform subsistence farming 
into a sustainable, viable commercial activity.’113 In another report AGRA stresses 
that ‘governments in sub-Saharan Africa need to put in place consistent and more 
robust policies that foster the growth of private markets, and in this way attract private 
investment capital that can complement the investment of public resources.’114 Grow 
Africa, a partnership platform established in 2011 to promote private sector 
investment in Africa, puts the task rather bluntly. ‘From the beginning,’ one of their 
framing documents begins, the aim has been to re-structure ‘agriculture as a business, 
not a social enterprise.’115 The New Vision for Agriculture, promoted by the World 
Economic Forum, also prioritizes market-based approaches to food security. As the 
2013 report rather awkwardly asks: ‘Are smallholders able fully to participate in the 																																																								
108 Ibid., p. xxv. The idea of the ‘social shell’ is taken from Gerry Kearns, “The Social Shell” Historical 
Geography Vol 34 (2006): pp 49-70  
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market, or are most still mainly at the subsistence level?’116 
 
In all of these statements there is an implicit contrast between market 
participation (‘good’) and subsistence agriculture (‘bad’). In reality, however, the 
issue is much less straightforward. Indeed as an agricultural group, subsistence 
farmers are often insulated from the worst effects of price increases precisely because 
they do not rely on the market for food provisioning. On the contrary when prices 
soar it is the poor who are partially or wholly reliant on food markets that are 
rendered precarious. An important report authored by the World Food Programme 
observed that while food markets help ‘promote efficiency in resource allocation, 
especially through the signals they send to food producers … [they] tend to fail most 
often and most severely for those who need them the most – the hungry poor.’117   
 
The trouble is that agrarian reformers rarely acknowledge the tendency for 
markets to tilt against the ‘hungry poor’; nor should we expect them to when their 
primary goal is to introduce commercial values at every point in the food chain. 
Witness Nigeria’s Minister for Agriculture, Akinwumi Adesina – recipient of Forbes 
magazine’s ‘African of the Year’ award in 2013 – summarize his intentions to 
modernize his country’s agriculture: ‘[W]e are restructuring the space for the private 
sector to add value to every single thing.’ ‘[In the past] we were not looking at 
agriculture through the right lens. We were looking at agriculture as a developmental 
activity, like a social sector in which you manage poor people in rural areas. But 
agriculture is not a social sector. Agriculture is a business. Seed is a business, 
fertilizer is a business, storage, value added, logistics and transport – it is all about 
business.’ 118  In his acceptance speech for the Forbes award Adesina made his 
priorities crystal clear: ‘My goal is to make as many millionaires, maybe even 
billionaires, from agriculture as possible.’119 The number of billionaires may indicate 
national economic growth, but it certainly tells us nothing about inequality, 
environmental justice and human welfare, issues that ought to be at the heart of 
‘development’ if the term is to mean anything. But this matters not because 
modernisers like Adesina firmly believe that policies that hasten marketization are by 
definition ‘good’ policies.  For them marketization is both means and end. 
 
It should be noted that for all the bluff about ‘de-regulation,’ today’s free-
marketers recognise that without state support they would be unable to implement 
their radical programme of trade liberalization. This helps to explain why agro-
companies were to the fore in condemning the ‘irrational’ actions of governments 
who responded to recent food price increases by imposing temporary export bans on 
vital provisions (despite the fact that such ‘irrational’ responses have been a 																																																								
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cornerstone of anti-famine policies for centuries).120 It explains too why the food 
industry is warning countries against experiments in food sovereignty and self-
sufficiency. ‘The terms “food security” and “food self-sufficiency” are not one in the 
same,’ asserts Paul Conway, the Vice Chairman at Cargill. ‘We strongly believe that 
people should produce what they are best at producing and trade their surpluses with 
others. This makes very basic economic sense.’121 Conway’s colleague, Greg Page, 
cites Libanius, a 4th century philosopher, who depicted commerce, and specifically 
the theory of comparative advantage, as God’s plan:  
 
God did not bestow all products upon all parts of the earth, but distributed 
gifts over different regions to the end that we might cultivate a social 
relationship, because one would need the help of another. And so God 
called commerce into being, that all might have common enjoyment of the 
fruits of the earth, no matter where produced.122 
 
When the Pope blesses transgenic seeds and free trade is branded as Godly-design 
then it is easy to see how secular facts quickly lose their appeal.  
 
Nonetheless, the warnings issued by Page and Conway to global leaders illustrates 
both the strengths and weaknesses of the liberalisation project. On the one hand, 
unless governments create policy environments conducive to private sector growth 
(so-called ‘pre-competitive investment needs’123) the liberalisation project will stutter 
and stagnate. On the other hand, the history of recent policy reforms – including state-
supported business development services, concessional lending practices (in order to 
attract foreign direct investment), encouragement of private property rights, rights to 
full repatriation of goods produced, tax holidays, exemptions from export duties, low 
land-use fees and permissive land policies, free or cheap use of the commons and so 
on – show that the private sector has been extraordinarily successful at state capture. 
On the plus side, seeing capitalist markets as made – a point also made by Polanyi and 
recently reiterated in two excellent studies124 – opens up the possibility that they 
might be made differently.125 ‘The market economy does not work alone in globalized 
relations,’ writes Amartya Sen. It follows from this that critically informed ‘public 
action … can radically alter the outcome of local and global economic relations.’126 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has traced not so much the emergence as the aggressive expansion of what 
Tony Weis has term ‘market-based or commoditized food security.’127 I have argued 
that the globalisation of this approach to food security depends on a series of 
mythologies about the primary causes of global hunger. Arguments that suggest that 
technology will ‘solve’ hunger and agricultural poverty, for example, fail to 
appreciate that technologies are only ever as strong as the political, social and 
economic forces that promote them. They are not automatically ‘pro-poor’ and will 
only serve the needs of people if they are designed and supported as part of a wider 
campaign of human rights and social justice. Those who believe that production and 
yield increases ought to be the focus of food security programmes typically ignore or 
downplay the fact that hunger is not an outcome of absolute food scarcity (such 
accounts also tend to turn a blind eye to how the present predicament of relative food 
scarcity is socially produced). Equally the high priests of market liberalisation fail to 
appreciate how capitalist markets can foster inequities and work against those who are 
most vulnerable. Thus the push to ‘de-regulate’ markets continues unabated, even as 
dominant economic powers belie the ‘free market’ position by pursuing subsides for 
agro-fuels and supporting legislation enabling the ever-deeper financialisation of the 
global food system. And finally arguments that depict hunger as an outcome of 
arrested development betray an astonishing disregard for alterity and difference as 
well as breathless confidence in the superiority of Western values and powers to 
organise society for the better.128  
 
I have suggested that the mythologies summarised above are invoked to 
bolster strategies that remove food policies from democratic discussion and 
participation, prioritizing instead the privatized administration of global food 
provisioning. One way that this ‘consensus’ is advanced is to say that progress of this 
nature is inevitable. It is, quite simply, ‘the way of the world’ and as such ‘there is no 
alternative,’ as Margaret Thatcher famously announced. 129  Yet another way to 
advance this inflexible agenda is to suggest that all efforts promoting it are simply an 
expression of philanthropic care for humanity. The claim that it is the white man’s 
burden to ‘fill full the mouth of famine’ remains as powerful as ever. Similar to 
modern humanitarian reason, then, food security serves to galvanize public empathy 
and in the process it converts a relationship of dominance (the governance of stricken 
lives) into one of assistance (the provision of a remedy).130 As philosopher Marianne 
Gronemeyer argues, ‘[t]he metamorphosis from a colonialism that “takes” to one that 
supposedly “gives” has been completed under the protection of this euphonious word, 
help.’ 131  Nowhere is this metamorphosis more complete and triumphant than in 
advance of global food security policies today. 
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